Fighting Unnecessary Court Secrecy

·  make it virtually impossible to determine whether the defendant’s discovery responses are truthful and complete;
·  are not time savers: the defendant will still attempt to avoid producing incriminating information; you will be barred from sharing information with other attorneys; and the defendant may lose its motivation to settle expeditiously;
·  may force you to reveal the identity of non-testifying experts or other privileged work product;
·  detract from your ability to prepare fact witnesses for deposition and to refresh their recollection for trial; and
·  chill the willingness of talented experts to assist you.
 
In short, protective orders can have disastrous results, both in terms of the overall civil justice system and in your individual cases.  The good news is that you have the power to fight them—and win.
 
YOU CAN FIGHT—AND BEAT—UNNECESSARY SECRECY IN YOUR CASES.
1)   Just Say No!
First and foremost, avoid stipulating to a protective order unless it is absolutely justified and appropriately limited.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and many state-court counterparts, a defendant has a burden of showing “good cause” for secrecy.  See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (“ Rule 26(c) places the burden of persuasion on the party seeking the protective order.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).  In light of this burden, there is no justification for agreeing to a broad protective order at the outset of a case simply to streamline the discovery process.  Such “stipulated” protective orders have come under increasing judicial criticism where unsupported by an independent showing of good cause.  See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d  Cir. 1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  A  defendant can and should be put to its proof that there is “good cause” for secrecy in any given case. 
Second, if you are hit with a motion for a protective order, try to muster the best possible arguments and evidence to oppose it.  (Remember, this near-term expense and effort usually pays off in the long run.)  Here are some practice pointers to assist your opposition:
 
2)   Stress the Presumptive Right of Public Access to Discovery Materials.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a presumptive right of public access to materials produced in discovery that may only be overcome by a particularized factual demonstration of good cause.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated, Rule 26(c)’s good cause re­quire­ment means that, “[a]s a general proposition, pretrial dis­covery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceed­ings.”  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); see also Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 130 (1989); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Coordi­nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 38–41 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal Courts, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1085, 1085–86 (1981).
 
3)    Stress That the Defendant Has the Burden of Showing “Good Cause,” Which Requires a Factual Demonstration of Specific, Significant Harm That Disclosure Would Cause.
The burden of establishing good cause for denying public access to discovery materials is on the party seeking the protective order.  See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145–46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987), aff’g 104 F.R.D. 559, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).  To meet this burden, it is not enough to show merely that some of the documents to be produced might contain trade secrets or confidential material.  The party seeking a protec­tive order must make a factual demonstration of particular potential harms and cannot rely on conclusory statements or broad generalizations.  Anderson v. Cryovac, 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2035, at 264–65 (1970)); Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130 (“A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.”); Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (“‘Good cause’ is established when it is specifically demonstrated that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury.  Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples, however, will not suffice.”); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsberg, 23 F.3d 772, 787–91 (3d Cir. 1994) (same; also setting forth various factors that may be considered in weighing good cause balance); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868 (1992) (same); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  Moreover, “the harm must be significant, not a mere trifle.”  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).  Finally, some courts have held that, in order to grant a protective order, a district court must “articulate specific facts justifying a protective order since that is imperative to ensure adequate appellate review.”  See Campbell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting district court’s grant of protective order based on “concern that the disclosure of discovery materials to the media could unduly prejudice the public” because it this was “exactly the type of broad, unsubstantiated allegation of harm that does not support a showing of good cause”).
 
4)   Urge That the Public Interest Be Weighed in the Good Cause Balance.
Even if the party seeking a protective order establishes that the material it seeks to protect rises to the level of a trade secret or other confidential information, and that public access poses a serious threat of significant commercial harm, some courts have held that Rule 26(c) requires consideration of whether the public’s interest in access outweighs the need for secrecy.  See Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] court always must consider the public interest when deciding whether to impose a protective order.”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d  Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987); Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (“The judge is the primary representative of the public interest in the judicial process and is duty-bound therefore to review any request to seal the record (or part of it) . . . . He may not rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record.”); Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (including among seven factors to consider  “whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety” and “whether the case involves issues important to the public”).
 
5)   Rebut any “Good Cause” Showing by Learning the Facts and Proving Them.
It is essential that you consult with experts and others about the need for a protective order.  Expert consultants and fact witnesses alike may be able to explain why certain information is already in the public domain or otherwise fails to qualify for protected status.  Consult with professional groups to see whether the defendant’s “confidential” procedures are in fact standard procedure in the industry.  Consult with other lawyers handling similar cases.  Do a NEXIS or Internet search to see whether the media has described the manufacturing process or the details of an operation of a business that the defendant now claims is confidential.
 
6)   Know How to Respond Effectively to Defendants’ Claims That Their Documents Contain “Trade Secrets.”
To determine whether something is a trade secret, six factors are typically considered:  (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the company; (2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and independent contractors involved with the company; (3) the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of its information; (4) the value of the information to the company and its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.  See  United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).         

A key point is that information concerning the hazardous nature of a product is not a trade secret.  See In re Upjohn Company Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483–84 (E.D. Mich. 1979).  Generally speaking, matters affecting the public health are not trade secrets.  See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 n.4 (Tex. 1987).  For corporate information to qualify as a “trade secret,” it must have competitive value:

We emphasize that the value of a trade secret lies in the competitive advantage it gives its owner over competitors . . . . If, however, a public disclosure of data reveals, for example, the harmful side effects of the submitter’s product and causes the submitter to suffer a decline in the potential profits from sales of the product, that decline in profits stems from a decrease in the value of the pesticide to consumers, rather than from the destruction of an edge the submitter had over its competitors, and cannot constitute the taking of a trade secret.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1012 n.15 (1984).
 
In addition, the competitive value of the information must exist in the present.  Stale information, such as data relating to a product that is long off the market, is not likely to be commercially valuable or to subject the company to competitive harm if released.  Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 1987); Parsons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
 
Where the allegedly secret materials concern matters of general knowledge within the industry, they are already in the public domain and are not “secrets.”  Or, where the information can be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act or by inspecting public records or published journals, it is not a trade secret.  Accordingly, “[m]ethods of manufacture or design and details of construction which are matters of general scientific knowledge in the industry do not constitute trade secrets.”  Midland-Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171, 177–78 (W.D. Pa.), aff’d, 435 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970).  Similarly, the sale of a product defeats trade secret status for commercial information where the information is readily ascertainable from examining the product, or from engaging in so-called “reverse engineering.”  Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199–200 (3d Cir. 1989).
 
You will find that most of the cases that defendants cite to support trade secret claims are actually commercial cases, having nothing to do with the issues involved in consumer actions.  The defendant will not be able to cite a single case to support its claim that documents concerning the inadequacies of its product, or safety testing, or reports of injuries or product failures, are “trade secrets.”
 
7)   Don’t Be Fooled by Corporate Claims of a Right to Privacy.
Another claim that is heard with increasing frequency is that open discovery violates a corporation’s “right to privacy.”  Individuals certainly enjoy a right to privacy deserving of protection in suitable cases, as recognized by Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).  Corporations, however, enjoy no such right.  As § 652I of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, “[e]xcept  for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.”  Comment c to Section 6521 further states, “[a] corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right to privacy.”  See also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (“a corporation has no . . . right to privacy”); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy”).
 
A related form of harm is “embarrassment.”  You have several arguments against this assertion.  First, because any unintended release of information may lead to embarrassment, this rule should be restricted to circumstances in which the embarrassment is “particularly serious.”   Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).  Second, because embarrassment is ordinarily associated with non-economic harm—i.e., bad feelings—it is “especially difficult” for a business enterprise to show embarrassment sufficient to merit a protective order.  Id.  Moreover, a broad, general claim of injury to reputation cannot suffice to show embarrassment.  Id.  (A contrary rule would provide an end-run around the requirement that the party seeking a protective order make a specific showing of the harm.)  The business must make a specific showing of the significant economic harm it would suffer from disclosure.  Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.
 
In a related context, a court has held that adverse publicity stemming from public reaction to the facts giving rise to liability does not justify entry of a sealing order governing court records, even where the parties stipulate to entry of the order.  Vassiliades v. Israely, 714 F. Supp. 604, 606 (D. Conn. 1989).  As one court stated, “[i]t is not the duty of federal courts to accommodate the public relations interests of litigants.”  In re Coordi­nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
 
8)  Stress That Mere Convenience Cannot Justify the Entry of a Protective Order.
It has been held that, absent a showing of good cause, mere convenience cannot overcome the presumptive right of public access to pretrial discovery.   Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).  See alsoIn re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).  In any event, ­Rule 26(c) does not permit protective orders to be entered solely because of case management concerns.
 
9)  Explain That Protective Orders Do Not Save Time in the Long Run.
As the Second Circuit wrote in In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987):  “Appellants argue that the cost of poring through the voluminous discovery materials in the Agent Orange litigation would be prohibitive.  However, appellants would have had to bear that cost during the pretrial stages of the litigation except for the protective orders.  The orders merely delayed a document-by-document assessment; they did not obviate the need for such an assessment . . . . Any inconvenience to which appellants are subjected certainly is outweighed by the enormous public interest in the Agent Orange litigation . . . .”  See also John Does I-VI v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D.D.C. 1986) (“[Blanket protective orders] often create more problems than they solve.  Blanket orders only postpone, rather than prevent, the need for the Court to closely scrutinize discovery materials to see if the seal is justified.”).
                         
10)  Stress That Protective Orders Waste Resources byPreventing Plaintiffs’ Attorneys from Sharing Discovery Materials.
Discovery-sharing advances the efficient and economical administration of justice.  Protective orders thwart this goal.  As the district court noted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 87 (D.N.J. 1986), this is unacceptable:  “[R]equiring each plaintiff in every similar ac­tion to run the same gauntlet over and over again serves no useful purpose other than to create barriers and discourage litigation against the Defendants.  Good cause as contemplated under Rule 26 was never intended to make other litigation more difficult, costly and less efficient.”  See alsoid. at 91; Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting wasteful­ness of preventing collaborative use of discovery materi­als).
 
IF YOU ARE FORCED TO SUBMIT TO A PROTECTIVE ORDER, AT LEAST TRY TO MINIMIZE ITS ADVERSE EFFECTS
 
1)  Fight any Provision That Broadly Permits the Desig­na­tion of Materials as “Confi­dential” at the Whim of the Producing Party. 
Defendants often seek approval of umbrella protective orders that place no limits on their ability to designate materials as “confidential.”  This is a blatant violation of the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c) and is contrary to those umbrella protective orders that have received judicial approval.   See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Information shall be designated as confidential only upon a good-faith belief that the information falls within the scope of confidential information under [Rule 26(c)].”) (emphasis added);  Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“General allegations of injury to reputation and client relationship or embarrassment that may result from dissemination of privileged documents is insufficient to justify judicial endorsement of an umbrella confidentiality agreement.”) (footnote omitted).
           
At the very least, an umbrella protective order should be limited to information that falls within the scope of Rule 26(c)’s specifications concerning the sort of material which can be kept secret.  Under that rule, the party request­ing secre­cy may prevail only if designated material is “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . .”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).  A protective order that broadly provides that any document produced in response to a ­discovery request may be designated confidential is plainly improper and unauthorized under discovery rules.
 
2)   Insist That any Proposed Order Contain a Mechanism for Challenging Confidentiali­ty Designations.
Defendants also often seek umbrella protective orders that contain no mechanism for challenging confidentiality designations.  However, it is well established that umbrella protective orders are permissible only where there is a built-in procedure for challenging any confidentiality designations made by a producing party; in the words of the Cipollone court, any other approach “would turn Rule 26(c) on its head.”  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986).  The umbrella order approved in Cipollone contained a procedure by which a party seeking to disclose material that had been designated confidential could shift the burden of demonstrating the need for secrecy back to the producing party.  This provision was a key factor in the Third Circuit’s decision to approve the order.  Seeid.
 
Similarly, in In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 354 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit approved a protective order where “[a] party challenging a ‘confidential’ designation could seek judicial review by making an objection.   Once a notice of objection was received, the party seeking to protect the sensitive material had ten days to apply to the district court for a ruling on the merits.”  Based on this provision, the Court held that the umbrella order did not run afoul of the good cause requirement because “the burden of proof justifying the need for the protective order remains on the movant; only the burden of raising the issue of confidentiality with respect to individual documents shifts to the other party . . .”  Id. at 356 (citations omitted).  See also McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk County, 876 F.2d 89, 90 (11th Cir. 1989) (approving protective order that “allows the producing party to designate a document confidential unless the other party objects.  At that point, the party asserting confidentiality is required to apply within fifteen days to the court for a ruling or concede the objection.”); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (approving order that does not shift the burden of showing confidentiality, leaving it, “as we believe the Constitution requires, on the party seeking protection”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (proponents of dissemination must indicate which documents they wish to disseminate, at which point burden is on opponents of dissemination to show good cause for existence of protective order).  See generally R. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 18 (1983) (“Usually, [stipulated protective orders] permit any party to challenge the confidentiality designation and obtain a ruling on the issue.”).
 
3)  Insist That You Be Permitted to Share Documents with Counsel for Plaintiffs in Other Cases.
Defendants also often seek to use protective orders to curtail cooperative discovery efforts among plaintiffs’ counsel in other, similar cases.  This, too, is unlawful and should be resisted.  Collaboration among attorneys has been specifically approved as promoting the speedy and less expensive resolution of cases, as well as the conservation of resources.  See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153–54 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31, 32–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
 
There is no reason why protective orders cannot be carefully tailored to protect a defendant’s alleged proprietary interests while allowing an exchange of discovered materials.  A protective order could provide, for example, that confidential material not be disclosed to the defendant’s competitors.  Such an order would guard the defendant’s proprietary information, while promoting efficiency in the trial process. 
 
4)  Insist That any Protective Order Not Permit the Sealing of Court Records.
Defendants also commonly include provisions in protective orders that permit the sealing of any court records that contain, or are annexed to, any discovery material that a defendant unilaterally designates “confidential.”  Not only is this one of the most egregious abuses of protective orders, but it is plainly contrary to law.   It is well established that public access to court records is protected by both the common law and the First Amendment.   See, e.g., Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he right of access to judicial records is beyond dispute.”); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (1st Cir. 1984).
 
The scope of the common law and First Amendment rights of access to judicial records has been most extensively addressed by the federal courts.  These federal decisions have repeatedly concluded that, once papers have been filed with the court, a party seeking to restrict access must satisfy a far more stringent test than the “good cause” standard applicable to pretrial discovery.  For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that discovery, “which is ordinarily conducted in private[,] stands on a different footing than does a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court” because “a motion or a settlement agreement filed with the court is a public component of a civil trial.”  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343–44 (3d Cir. 1986).  Accordingly, motions filed with the court “are matters which the public has a right to know about and evaluate.”  Id.  Once a document is placed before the Court, “it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the access accorded such records.”  Id. at 345; accord Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660–61 (3d Cir. 1991) (summarizing cases holding that right of public access applies to materials filed in connection with a motion).  See also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing “strong presumption in favor of access to court records” that can only be overcome by “compelling reasons for secrecy”); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993).  (Note, however, that at least one court has distinguished documents attached to dispositive motions from those attached to non-dispositive motions, holding that the latter receive less protection.  See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006).)
 
Thus, the common law and First Amendment presumptions of access apply to materials filed with a court regardless of whether they have been designated as “confidential” during the discovery process.  Even if a document was subject to a protective order during discovery, when it is filed in court, it must meet a higher standard to remain confidential.  It is vitally important to fight any attempt to use a discovery protective order to shield documents that are ultimately filed with a court.
 
5)   Fight any Provision That Requires Discovery Materials to Be Returned and Surrendered to the Producing Party.
Defendants also often seek to require plaintiffs’ attorneys to “return and surrender” discovery materials upon the conclusion of the case.  This type of provision has been specifically condemned by an ABA resolution:  “An attorney for plaintiff should only be required to return copies of documents obtained from the Defendant on condition that Defendant agrees not to destroy any such documents so that they will be available, under appropriate circumstances, to government agencies or to other litigants in future cases.”  Action of the ABA House of Delegates ¶ 11.
 
Be sure to resist any “return and surrender” provisions in cases where you are forced to submit to a protective order.  Otherwise, you may be the last lawyer to see the materials that prove a defendant’s misconduct!
 
GET HELP!
Whatever else you do, do not hesitate to get help.   The public interest law firm we work for, Public Justice, has a nationwide campaign—Project ACCESS—dedicated to monitoring, exposing, and fighting unnecessary court secrecy nationwide. As part of Project ACCESS, Public Justice has compiled extensive materials to help plaintiffs oppose unnecessary protective orders.  For further information about stopping protective order abuse, please contact Public Justice, 1825 K Street, N.W., Suite 200, Washington, D.C.20006, (202) 797-8600 (phone), (202) 232-7203 (fax), http://www.publicjustice.net (website).
 
Similarly, don’t forget to contact other lawyers who have handled similar cases in the past.  They often have briefs, orders, and other extremely useful information.  Again, if your case has significant public health or safety implications, call Public Justice immediately.  We are interested and can help you.  Above all, remember that others have traveled this road many times before.  We can all benefit from working together.